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Abstract 
 
 
This paper studies China coercive diplomacy by first 
analyzing the South China Sea (SCS) issue from the 
perspective of China national interest which has Belt & Road 
Initiatives (BRI) political agenda (formerly known as OBOR). 
Through BRI, China will be a counterweight to the world 
economic power in countering US hegemony. This paper aims 
to describe the coercive form of China diplomacy which has 
been implemented through both phenomena and to analyze 
China coercive diplomacy using theory and relevant concept. 
To achieve those goals, this paper employs qualitative 
research method as well as national interest and neorealism 
theory. The findings of this paper suggest that, in reflection of 
China-Sri Lanka bilateral experience, BRI is one of debt-track 
diplomacy of China commodities in maintaining energy and 
economy security. This paper is expected to be one of the 
studies about South China Sea which can see BRI more in the 
opportunities it brings. 
 
© 2019 Published by Indonesia Defense University   
 
INTRODUCTION 
The South China Sea dispute has proven the 
magnitude of China’s ambitions in meeting 
its national interest. The nine-dashed line 
stretching from China’s national waters to 
other national waters, including Japan, 
Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, 
Myanmar and also Indonesia, is claimed by 
China based on historic arguments that they 
continue to make. However, the Permanent 
Arbitrage Court (PCA) stated that nine-
dashed line is illegal since it does not comply 
with principles and rules of 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS, 1982). 
This dispute was then won by Philippines 
as the country which brought this case to 
PCA in 2013. China responded to that 
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decision by stating they will never meet the 
final decision of the court. Their historical 
argument claims that all area of South China 
Sea is a territory under full control of China 
based on their “historical rights.” 
In 2009, China also mentioned in front of 
United Nations (UN) General Assembly that 
nine-dashed line is a territory under full 
control of china, once again by referring to 
the “historical waters” during the times of 
Great China Empire long ago, where the 
nine-dashed line area includes coastal 
countries such as Prata, Macclesfield Bank, 
Scarborough Shoal, Paracel and Spartly 
Islands. 
These islands are located in South China 
Sea which are claimed by several coastal 
countries in the region, and these countries 
have carried out economic, tourism, and 
development activities long before China. 
The areas within the nine-dashed line can be 
seen in the Figure 1. 
Despite the PCA’s decision, China 
continued to deploy military or trade ships to 
carry out activities in South China Sea area in 
order to strengthen their de facto control over 
the area. Recently in Thitu Island, China 
Navy deployed 95 ships to intimidate 
Philippines into stopping their construction 
activities in that island (Yudha, 2019). The 
presence of other actors in South China Sea 
has also escalated the conflict in this area. 
In 2017, the presence of United States 
(US) had an impact on China. The USS Carl 
Vinson supercarrier made a diplomatic visit 
to Vietnam as a sign of US support to 
Vietnam. This was strengthened by various 
cooperation between Vietnam and China’s 
rivals, such as India and Japan (Mohamad, 
2018). The involvement of United States in 
Asia Pacific has continued to introduce 
military powers and influence in this region. 
After all, ASEAN member countries are 
receiving US aid through the deployment of 
military base in Philippines and also the US 
revocation of Vietnam arms embargo. United 
States believe that South China Sea is an 
international shipping line, hence it cannot be 
owned by one nation. Therefore, Australia 
and other countries were also deploying 
warships in the disputed Islands in South 
China Sea. These actions were carried out to 
make sure that shipping line runs accordingly 
without any confrontations with the China 
(Debora, 2016). 
Through the next China’s initiatives, these 
conflicts have been made as if nonexistent or 
slowly disappearing. In 2013, Xi Jinping 
issued an idea to unite regional connectivity. 
He named the idea One Belt, One Road. 
China wants to reopen the international trade 
route similar to China’s predecessors, namely 
the Silk Road. This is a route which is 
expected to connect Beijing to Southeast 
Asia, Central Asia, Europe and Africa 
through sets of infrastructures connectivity, 
including railway, highway, pipes and also 
port infrastructures to support international 
shipping and trade line on the sea. One Belt, 
One Road was then renamed into Belt Road 
Initiative (BRI) which continues to prioritize 
Eurasia and Africa connectivity (Ramadhan, 
2018).  
The BRI has also been nicknamed China 
Marshall Plan, by providing aids to stimulate 
the economies of underdeveloped nations and 
also as a form of foreign aid, i.e. China’s 
diplomatic strategy to invest in economies 
throughout the world through trade 
commodities. BRI is also referred to as the 
21st Century Silk Road which focuses on land 
trade corridor and also international shipping 
route (Kommenda, 2019). BRI’s route can be 
seen in Figure 2, which shows how Quanzhou 
is connected to Southeast Asia, i.e. Malaysia-
Sri Lanka-Pakistan, up to Venice. While the 
land route is from Beijing-Irkutsk, Xi’an-
Moscow, Xi’an Duisburg in Baltic region. 
China has spent a tremendous amount of 
money for this project, approximately 
US$ 300 million – 1 trillion (Mangkuto, 
2019; Andriani, 2019), to  invest in countries 
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Figure 1. China’s Nine-dashed line 
Source: Australia Plus ABC, detik.com, 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Belt and Road Initiative Route  
Source: (Kommenda, 2019) 
 
 
they deem strategic, such as Indonesia, 
Pakistan, India and Poland. The fund is 
transferred in the form of loan, grant, or 
foreign investment to those countries.  
However, countries involved in this 
program are worried over the possibility of 
dependence and losing their control. 
Scholars, economists and foreign policy 
practitioners agree that China loan causes 
problems and difficult to be repaid. One 
example that needs to be studied is Pakistan 
(Ramadhan, 2018).  
Due to Pakistan-China economic cooperation 
through China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
in 2015, Pakistan faces difficulty in 
repayment and allows China to take over 
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80% of their domestic projects, including the 
construction of power plant, railway and 
Gwandar port – to the point that China has 
obtained the rights of management of that 
port for dozens of years in the future. In 
addition, Sri Lanka has also failed to return a 
loan in the amount of US$ 1.5 million – 
allowing China to take control of their port 
for 99 years (“Lima Tahun Program Jalur 
Sutra 8 Negara Masuk Jebakan Tiongkok,” 
2018). 
The author argues that BRI is China’s 
coercive diplomacy to other nations, 
especially developing countries which need 
fund to sustain their domestic infrastructure 
development. If they fail to repay the loan, 
their assets will be taken by China. This is a 
threat for countries that enter into this 
cooperation agreement, i.e. the handover of 
assets which will ultimately threaten the 
national security of a state due to the transfer 
of ownership of their assets to foreign nation. 
This type of coercive diplomacy is in line 
with the South China Sea dispute. Although 
PCA has decreed China’s claim as illegal in 
reference to the provisions of UNCLOS 
1982, China remains confident in their claim 
over South China Sea. China’s national 
security reflects a desire to control the 
resources in South China Sea. The US Energy 
Information and Administration (EIA) 
estimated that South China Sea contains a 
wealth of 11 million barrels of oil and 190 
trillion cubic of natural gas reserves (US 
Energy Information Administration, 2013). 
In addition, EIA also mentioned that South 
China Sea is one of the regions with rare 
natural resources that is not available in many 
countries in the world, outside of Middle 
East, Africa and Russia. 
This sets a background for China’s 
national interest in making confrontation in 
South China Sea, namely the need for 
resources, energy supply for China’s future. 
EIA explained that China is the biggest 
importer of oil and gas in the world after 
United States. In 2012, crude oil and natural 
gas contributes to 20% of China’s total 
consumption and China imported 6.1 million 
barrels of oil every day in 2014. China’s oil 
production is clearly inadequate in meeting 
their domestic oil demand and needs. 
Therefore, it can be argued that China is 
highly dependent on oil imports (Ni Putu 
Saraswati Puspita Dewi, 2017). 
Furthermore, China’s connectivity 
initiative is also driven by the same interest. 
BRI signatory countries are those with 
energy, resource potential for China. This is 
also supported by several tracks of 
infrastructure agreement by China, such as 
The New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic 
Corridor. This corridor connects the land 
route of member states to meet the Silk Road 
Economic Belt, in the form of railway, oil and 
gas pipes. 
In addition, Maritime Silk Road is 
renovation of infrastructure and construction 
of ports in line with international shipping 
route through regional cooperation, policy 
coordination, monetary cooperation and trade 
facility. Belt and Road Initiative has become 
China’s foreign policy and diplomatic 
instrument to spread their influence, 
economic power to countries within BRI. 
At a glance, BRI appears to provide more 
benefit for countries within it, in the form of 
facilitation for infrastructure development, 
renovation of ports which is beneficial in 
terms of sustainable development. However, 
the patterns of interaction and diplomacy 
carried out by China in South China Sea and 
also their monetary policy through the 
Initiative should be noted. China’s pattern of 
interaction and diplomacy seems to be quite 
concerning for many countries. 
China’s non-compliance to PCA decision 
and their deployment of warships in South 
China Sea has allowed China to have a de 
facto, not de jure, presence. Not to mention 
their diplomatic tactics through BRI in 
making developing countries trapped in debt 
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bondage has allowed them to take control 
national assets as a compensation for the non-
payment of those countries to the Initiative. 
A patter of coercive diplomacy designed 
to meet China’s national interest in meeting 
their energy needs and security can thus be 
described. Both South China Sea dispute and 
BRI are tactics designed to meet China’s 
resource needs which they cannot fulfill 
domestically. Therefore, this paper will study 
how China implements its coercive 
diplomacy through South China Sea dispute 
and BRI in order to meet their national 
interest. 
This paper aims to (1) describe the 
coercive form of China’s diplomacy which is 
implemented through the two phenomena, 
and (2) analyze China’s coercive diplomacy 
using theory and relevant concepts. The 
discussion in this paper will be divided into 
several sections, namely theoretical studies 
employed with regard to coercive diplomacy, 
national interest and geopolitics. The second 
section will analyze coercive diplomacy in 
relation to other concepts that are related to 
the two phenomena. The final section will 
explain China’s national interest in diffusing 
its influence through the two phenomena. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
State makes various attempts to meet its 
interest and needs. This is driven by threats 
that are deemed crucial for a state. Therefore, 
the concept of national interest emerges to 
study this problem. Hans J. Morgenthau is a 
classical realist scholar in International 
Relations. He explained that a material 
perception of threat to state can drive patterns 
of state movement to meet national interest. 
Morgenthau described national interest in 
terms of power. A state policy-maker will 
refer to state conditions, principles to meet 
what the country needs in a “self-help” 
manner. The economic capability of a state 
will thus be equally important as military 
power (Burchill, 2005). 
Kegley and Wittkopf explained that 
national interest is simple issues related to 
self-defense against attacks, threats that can 
disrupt day to day life. All policy makers or 
state leaders have the same objectives, but 
limited in terms of options, resources and 
assistance, both internally and externally. 
Ultimately, there is a necessity to strike other 
actors in order to meet one’s own needs 
(Wittkopf., 1993). 
Kenneth Waltz and Mearsheimer are 
neorealist scholars who described national 
interest from different perspective compared 
to Morgenthau. Waltz explained that state’s 
objective is simply to pursue security and 
power in order to defend against threats 
(Anam & Ristiyani, 2018). Mearsheimer 
explained that state’s objective to meet its 
national interest is an attempt or method to 
become the hegemonic power, to conquer 
international system in a region for the sake 
of regional stability (Sorensen, 2013). 
National interest is inseparable with the 
concept of politics, especially geopolitics. 
National interest will move in line with the 
geographical condition of an entity, i.e. the 
national interest of a country. The policy or 
initiative implemented by China cannot be 
separated with this concept. Geopolitics 
refers to political influence and interest that 
impacts the geographic factor of state 
behavior, including natural condition, climate 
and their physical territory. The 
determination of foreign policy, state’s 
method of interaction, is adjusted to such 
condition. State can be categorized as 
stronger and richer if it has strategic physical 
condition in supporting economic and 
political progress. The ultimate end of 
geopolitics is state utilizing the geographical 
condition to obtain a sustainable comparative 
advantage (Ni Putu Saraswati Puspita Dewi, 
2017). 
Prominent geopolitics describe an 
advantageous geographical condition for 
states that control or have leverage in 
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utilizing the land and the sea. Halford 
Mckinder explained that a state can be 
considered successful in land utilization if 
they can control the Heartland, i.e. Eurasia. 
He clearly mentioned that the one who 
controls Eurasia will be the one to control the 
world and international system. Meanwhile, 
A.T. Mahan explained that control over sea 
will translate to state power. A country that 
controls international shipping route will be 
the one to control international relations 
system (S., 1997). 
It can be argued that China’s ambition to 
control the land and the sea is quite relevant 
with McKinder and Mahan’s geopolitical 
analysis. If the two elements of geography 
can be controlled, then international order 
can be controlled and china can become a 
hegemonic power able to control regional 
stability. 
In meeting national interest and 
geopolitical perspective, there needs to be an 
instrument, tool to communicate with other 
actors. Therefore, the role of diplomacy 
becomes crucial. Marks and Freeman (2019) 
explained that diplomacy is a method, means 
to influence actors, government or people 
through communication, dialogue, 
negotiation. Modern diplomacy does not only 
involve 2 states, but also many state, non-
state, international organization and their 
derivatives (Freeman, 2019). 
Diplomatic instruments are strengthened 
with legal instrument to ensure that 
diplomacy has binding legal power that can 
prevent violation if countries agree to enter 
into agreement. US State Department 
mentioned several diplomatic instruments 
(US Department of State, 2019), namely: 
1. Treaties 
2. Convention 
3. Alliance 
4. Accords 
To meet national interest, current modern 
diplomatic practice has its own message and 
impression. Diplomatic practice becomes 
state instrument to commit violence, use of 
force, and can be detrimental to parties 
involved within. This diplomacy is referred 
to as Coercive Diplomacy. Coercive 
diplomacy is defined as a persuasion to 
pressure actors involved within, through the 
use of force, military instrument, economic 
sanction, trade war or asymmetric agreement 
(Manulak, 2011). 
Alexander George stated that coercive 
diplomacy is a type of diplomacy that, “in 
hopes of securing a peaceful resolution of a 
serious dispute by persuading an opponent to 
stop or undo his effort to alter the status quo 
situation.” George (Manulak, 2011) 
mentioned several variants of coercive 
diplomacy as follows: 
1. “Try and see” approach, looking at the 
threat and finding ways to persuade the 
opponent to change their stance. 
2. “Gradually turning the screws approach,” 
giving pressures to avoid unwanted 
circumstances. 
3. “Classic ultimatum” approach, giving 
clear threat submitting demand at the right 
time. 
4. “Tacit ultimatum” approach, giving clear 
threat but not at the right time. 
South China Sea dispute has greatly 
impacted Asia Pacific region. US’ presence 
in the region has also significantly influenced 
China’s movement. Nine-dashed line is an 
illegal diplomatic practice, where China 
continue to make their claim and deploy 
warships in South China Sea to show their de 
facto presence, despite contradicting 
international law. In addition, BRI is 
expected to be able to give foreign aid to 
developing countries, but the economic 
policy offered by China has adversely 
impacted developing countries. Therefore, 
the concept and theory employed in this 
paper refers to National Interest, Geopolitics 
and Coercive Diplomacy as analytical tools 
to study the above problems. 
 Haetami/Jurnal Pertahanan Vol. 5 No. 2 (2019) pp.48-60 
 
54 
 
In studying the above issues, the author 
employs library research technique to collect 
and select information from various sources 
that are relevant with the above problem, 
consisting of literatures in the form of books, 
journals, news, official documents and 
statements, interview and internet. Data 
constitutes a foundation of the paper to 
analyze and study the above problem. As 
such, the author uses primary and secondary 
data which have been selected, and processed 
by sources mentioned above. The utilization 
of book, journal and reliable internet sources 
became the supporting data of this paper. 
 
DISCUSSION 
South China Sea dispute has been escalating 
over the last few years. China’s movement in 
this water is considered to be against existing 
principles. There is no region that can be 
controlled by one nation. South China Sea is 
a region that includes and bordered with all 
regions within it, especially Central Asia and 
Southeast Asia. The deployment of China 
warship in various points has deterred other 
countries to continue their developmental 
activities. This is shown in the case of Thitu 
Island where China Navy deployed 95 ships 
to intimidate Philippines into stopping their 
construction activities in that island (Yudha, 
2019). 
The deployment of military base in 
Spartly Island becomes a trigger of conflict 
by China. Spartly Island is one of the islands 
disputed by various states, such as Vietnam, 
Philippines, and Brunei. Although the 
island’s status is under dispute, China has 
deployed advanced military installation with 
complete weaponry, runway, helipad and so 
on. The figure 3 below illustrates China’s 
military base in Spartly Island. 
De facto-wise, China has built military 
base despite the fact that the island is still 
under dispute. A complete military 
installation can only exacerbate the situation. 
In terms of balance of power, this installation 
proves that China is able to project their 
power outside of its sovereign territory. By 
building military base, sovereign territory 
shall be considered in accordance with the 
provisions of UNCLOS 1982. But 
normatively, China’s definition is clearly 
illegal and unjustified by international 
community. PCA has stated that China’s 
movement in South China Sea is illegal. 
Moreover, the presence of China navy in 
Thitu Island is a Maritime Power Projection 
to ensure that China can maintain its de facto 
presence, by insisting their argument that 
South China Sea is historically a traditional 
fishing ground owned by China. 
These China ships were not only deployed 
from the Navy and China Coast Guard, but 
also China’s maritime militia which involves 
fisherman and their boats. China’s maritime 
militia is a paramilitary organization, in 
which civilian fisherman is armed and given 
military doctrines to carry out activities in 
South China Sea, and told to make 
confrontation against other countries trading 
in the international waters. China fishing 
industry is one of the biggest fishing 
industries, and China has 200,000 fisherman 
boats armed by the Government of China to 
be a proxy of their interest in South China Sea 
(James, 2015). 
The use of fisherman and trade boat is 
against international law principles, 
especially humanitarian law. The 
involvement of civilians in military practice 
is a threat to civilian themselves if open war 
or conflict occurs between state militaries. 
The role of fisherman and trade boat becomes 
bias, and China must be dealt with because of 
involving civilians in protecting territory, 
particularly the military power on the sea. 
China’s military power is obviously not only 
in military component, but also civilian 
participation to advocate for China’s 
presence in international waters. Threats that 
are perceived material by China is 
construction,   exploitation    and    utilization
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Figure 3. China Military Base in Spartly Islands 
Source: (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Universal Role of Navy 
Source: (Ken., 2015) 
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of area, land and island in South China Sea 
by other countries, such as Philippines in 
Thitu Island, and the deployment of 
Indonesian military base in Natuna. Energy 
and resource crisis is a threat to China’s 
energy security if other countries exploit the 
resources in South China Sea. Resource 
control is China’s desire in meeting their 
national interest. The presence of military 
installation in Spartly Island and also routine 
patrol by the navy is China’s coercive 
diplomacy to meet their interest. With the 
presence of China navy in South China Sea, 
the effect of confrontation and “ownership” 
of the sea becomes clear according to China. 
Alexander George’s coercive diplomacy 
approach is thus relevant with the above 
condition and problem. 
Therefore, the “gradually turning the 
screws” approach can be analyzed. This can 
be seen by the continuous confrontation by 
China through their navy power, either their 
military and civilian. This coercive 
diplomacy approach is in line with the 
theoretical role of navy in diplomacy. Figure 
4 illustrates the universal role of navy. 
Navy does not only have military role, but 
also diplomatic and constabulary role. These 
roles are utilized by China through projection 
of power, naval diplomacy, and also the role 
of sovereignty projected to outside of China’s 
water territory to Spartly and Thitu Island. In 
addition, this is in line with James Cable’s 
concept of gunboat diplomacy. This 
diplomacy involves naval power or known as 
Naval Diplomacy. 
China’s strategy in deploying their naval 
ships and militia is referred to as Purposeful 
Force. This persuasive diplomacy through 
navy is carried out by distributing warships to 
achieve predetermined objectives. Thus, 
naval diplomacy is implemented to influence 
other state’s foreign policy (Le Mière, 2014). 
It can thus be argued that the deployment 
of China navy in South China Sea is in line 
with the concept of coercive diplomacy – as 
well as naval diplomacy with the aim of 
purposeful force. The continuous presence of 
navy in South China Sea is expected to be 
able to change the movement of other states, 
both in terms of ship mobility and also their 
policy and stance toward South China Sea. 
The grand initiative and project of BRI by 
China can be argued as a form of coercive 
diplomacy. Countries that have entered into 
economic cooperation with China, such as 
Pakistan, Djibouti and Sri Lanka, are 
impacted by that cooperation. Although this 
initiative has provided huge impact in terms 
of development, these countries became 
trapped in huge debt bondage and faced 
difficulties to access loan from China. Figure 
5 illustrates several states that have huge debt 
risk due to BRI. 
 
 
Figure 5. Debt Chart of BRI-Debtor Countries 
Source: The Guardian, 2019 
 
The above figure illustrates states’ debt to 
BRI, minus their gross domestic product 
condition, or states’ debt compared to the 
value and service produced by the concerned 
state. In the above figure, the three states set 
an example of the impact of China’s coercive 
diplomacy in the form of debt-trap 
diplomacy. Debt-trap diplomacy is a new 
terminology in international relations which 
emerged in 2017, where debtor country 
becomes trapped in their debt, which can 
happen intentionally or otherwise through 
huge lending. 
This diplomatic practice is also known as 
debtbook diplomacy, which is defined as the 
provision of loan in the form of huge debt to 
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gain national assets and influence over the 
debtor country (Chefitz, 2018).  
One case that needs to be studied is the 
case of Hambantota port of Sri Lanka which 
saw up to 85% of its ownership handed over 
to China while the state must pay their debt 
for 99 long years. Due to Sri Lanka’s failure 
to repay their debt in few years, the collateral 
that they can gave to China was the 
possibility of repurposing that port for 
China’s naval port hub. This economic power 
has obviously created negative impact in the 
eyes of international community. US naval 
officer, Admiral Scott Swift described 
China’s economic diplomacy as: 
“…increase debt in a given country and then 
turn around and ask for something in return 
that was not part of the original 
negotiation.”(Moriyasu, 2018) 
It is stated that economic negotiation and 
foreign investment to Sri Lanka is obliged to 
pay collateral to China due to non-payment. 
Ultimately, debtor country is obliged to give 
something to lender country. In this case, 
Magampura Mahinda Rajapaksa port in 
Hambatonta became Sri Lanka’s collateral to 
China. China’s coercive diplomacy is clearly 
relevant with debt-trap diplomacy by gaining 
national asset, and making direct political 
impact to Sri Lanka in terms of 
administration, bureaucracy, and also 
domestic infrastructure mobility. 
In addition, Pakistan also becomes the 
‘victim’ of China’s debtbook diplomacy 
through BRI. As per China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (CPEC), China and 
Pakistan entered into economic cooperation 
to construct port infrastructure and the fund 
disbursed by China amounted to US$ 62 
million. Port development were planned for 
40 years up to 2059. Due to that economic 
agreement, China gained 91% and 85% profit 
over the surrounding free zone in Gwadar 
port, Pakistan. Furthermore, Pakistan is 
obliged to pay US$ 16 million to a China 
bank for the development of Gwadar port, 
free trade zone, and communication 
infrastructure plus 13% interest and 7% 
insurance fee. IMF has warned that the loan 
may disrupt the sustainability of Pakistan’s 
gross domestic product in the amount of 
7.5%. Since the large majority of the port is 
owned by China, Pakistan must spend a lot in 
port maintenance and operation, causing 
Pakistan to be trapped in China’s debt-trap 
(Chefitz, 2018). Many are worried that 
Gwadar port will be used by China as their 
hub port, including their warships, in the 
future. 
Both South China Sea dispute and BRI can 
be argued as China’s strategy to achieve their 
national interest, namely the fulfillment of 
energy needs in the outer area of China, such 
as Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Middle East. 
China’s claim in South China Sea is a form of 
coercive diplomacy through the use of navy 
as diplomacy instrument (Naval Diplomacy 
and Gunboat Diplomacy) and force, such as 
the use of maritime militia which involves 
civilian fishermen. The continuous 
deployment of navy is expected to change 
various countries’ foreign policy toward 
South China Sea, including Vietnam, 
Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. 
BRI is China’s geopolitical ambition 
through economic cooperation, infrastructure 
development on land and sea, i.e. controlling 
Heartland (Eurasia) through debt-trap or 
debtbook diplomacy through BRI economic 
cooperation with developing countries. Thus, 
the subjugation of national asset is carried out 
to facilitate access China’s shipping access 
and route from Europe-Africa-Middle East-
Central Asia-Southeast Asia to Beijing. 
China’s strategy is a form of land and ocean 
domination to revive the Silk Road which 
was built by China’s predecessors in order to 
reach the glorious days when China rules and 
dominates the world. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusion that can be made from the 
above discussion on China Coercive 
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Diplomacy through South China Sea dispute 
and Belt and Road Initiative is that their 
strategies and foreign policies have violated a 
lot of international law principles, including 
humanitarian law, law of the sea and 
international ethics. This can be seen from 
how China has ignored PCA decision over 
South China Sea by deploying their naval 
warships in order to have a de facto presence 
in South China Sea in accordance with their 
nine-dashed line claims. Fishermen are used 
as diplomatic mechanism that also present in 
that area. The use of civilian in operation 
other than war clearly violates humanitarian 
law. BRI is considered to have violate 
international principle because China’s loan 
and grants ultimately end in the handover of 
national assets, meaning there is an economic 
domination and imperialism against 
developing countries by China. 
Theory and concepts employed in this 
paper is relevant with the current condition, 
facts, and circumstances. Coercive 
diplomacy is clearly implemented by China 
in South China Sea, through the deployment 
of warships, and maritime militia in South 
China Sea area to initiate confrontation and 
the use of navy to pronounce their 
sovereignty over South China Sea despite the 
decision of PCA. In addition, BRI economic 
initiative and cooperation ultimately ends in 
the handover and control over national assets 
of developing countries which has an impact 
on their domestic economy and politics. 
Debtbook or debt-trap diplomacy has caused 
countries to fall in debt bondage and 
insurmountable bank interest due to BRI 
obliges the use of China’s infrastructure 
investment bank (AIIB) to transfer the loan. 
China’s coercive diplomacy is implemented 
to meet its national interest, namely the 
sustainability of natural resources including 
oil and natural gas. Eurasia and other areas in 
Heartland have huge oil potential that can 
meet China’s energy needs. 
Diplomacy is a practice to present and 
project state’s national interest. Economic 
cooperation and military confrontation is 
considered as diplomatic practice carried out 
by China to meet their national interest. 
Kegley and Wittkopf explained that national 
interest shall be carried out and enforced even 
by destroying other countries because other 
options have been deemed ineffective. 
China’s foreign practices and strategies are 
form of self-defense strategy against their 
perceived threat, namely natural resources 
crisis for the sustainability and needs of all 
China people. 
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